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The case of Bosnia presents analysts with a complex set of circumstances and factors 
surrounding multiple instances of intervention, carried out by a diverse set of external actors. 
Indeed, even the distinction between "internal" and "external" might be considered problematic 
in this case. For the purposes of this analysis, the conflict among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, 
and Bosnian Muslims (who have since adopted the "Bosniac" label) is defined as an internal 
conflict over the status of the territory and its internal political organization. This conflict erupted 
as part of the larger set of conflicts surrounding the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federal 
state, of which Bosnia and Herzegovina was a federal "republic". However, the larger conflict 
will be treated only as context, and not subjected to detailed analysis here. The direct and indirect 
involvement of the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia in the internal Bosnian conflict, 
which could be defined as "external" interventions by local powers, are instead treated here as 
dimensions of the internal conflict. The involvement of these local powers, and their very real 
interests in the outcome of the conflict, were important factors affecting the series of decisions 
by US and other Western policymakers, as well as UN actors, concerning intervention. Recent 
changes that have moved both Croatia and Serbia in the direction of democratization, disavowal 
of support for the ethnic dismemberment of Bosnia, and even affirmation of the principle of 
territorial integrity have improved the prospect that international intervention will ultimately 
succeed in establishing some form of multinational state in Bosnia, although the institutional 
character of such a state remains in doubt. This paper focuses on the decisions and actions of 
external policymakers, and US policymakers in particular, as "third parties" to the conflict, and 
the outcomes of their interventions in it.  
 
Interventions in the Bosnian conflict fall into several distinct categories: diplomatic/political 
peacemaking intended to find a solution to the conflict; military/diplomatic peacekeeping 
intended at first to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, then used to secure and maintain 
the limited agreements reached by the parties during the course of the conflict and, finally, to 
carry out UN decisions taken without the support of the warring parties; humanitarian relief 
operations, carried out with the support of peacekeeping forces and intended to redress the 
suffering of the civilian population; the imposition of economic and other sanctions under the 
authority of the UN Security Council; acts of deterrence, carried out through a combination of 
military threats and the demonstrative use of force; implementation of a comprehensive strategy 
of coercive diplomacy, including the use of limited, but effective force; and, finally, military 
occupation and state-building intended to implement the settlement imposed on the warring 
parties. The humanitarian relief effort in Bosnia was an extension of the UNHCR operations 
initiated in October 1991 in response to the outbreak of fighting associated with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was carried out, with some gaps, for the entire duration of the 
war in Bosnia, and continued on thereafter. Military occupation and state-building represent 
essentially post-conflict involvement, designed to secure the results of intervention. This paper 
focuses on the forms of intervention (peacemaking, peacekeeping, deterrence, and coercive 
diplomacy) that reflected the gradual escalation of direct involvement in the conflict on the part 
of the United States, the European powers, the United Nations and, in the end, Russia.  
 
Peacemaking 
The initial involvement of the European powers in the Yugoslav conflict(s) was motivated by a 
clearly articulated desire to prevent escalation of the political conflicts surrounding disintegration 
of the country into armed conflict. Several interests and motivations lay behind this desire. These 
included the straightforward security interest of the European states in preventing armed conflict 
in a neighboring state; the political interest of some states in advancing the role of common 
European (EC and, later, EU) foreign policy making institutions in international security affairs; 
the concern that armed conflict would likely generate an influx of significant numbers of 
refugees into Western Europe, with potentially costly and socially destabilizing consequences; 
and the pressure of domestic constituencies calling for action. Relatively early in the conflict, the 
European states deliberated and rejected military intervention in favor of a diplomatic effort to 
facilitate negotiation of a formula for a peaceful settlement among the Yugoslavs. Thus, the 
initial intervention by outside actors took the form of diplomatic and political peacemaking 
activities, without the backing of a credible threat of force.  
 
Actual peacemaking efforts by the European powers were preceded by rhetorical efforts to 
encourage the parties themselves to resolve their differences peacefully. The Europeans 
expressed their support for existing internal and external borders, while the United States 
discouraged secession. Although the United States left the door open to border changes by 
"peaceful consensual means," it offered no support for such changes. The European and 
American positions reflected a mechanistic application of existing Helsinki principles of inter-
state relations. But these were designed for a period of relative stability, made possible by 
détente between the superpowers. Their application to intra-state or inter-group relations under 
conditions of enormous uncertainty and instability was ineffective. The ineffectivenss of Western 
and, particularly, US responses in this early period appear to have been compounded by a failure 
on the part of state policymaking establishments to mobilize outside expertise in these efforts. It 
was already clear to many academic and other experts, after a January 1991 meeting of the 
Serbian and Slovenian leaders, that a negotiated agreement among the regional leaders of 
Yugoslavia over internal borders would be essential to maintaining peace in that country; that 
such an agreement was likely to involve changes, perhaps substantial changes, to the status quo; 
and that such an agreement would be difficult to achieve by consensual means without external 
assistance in the form of incentives for the Yugoslavs (in the initial stages of dissolution, 
primarily the Serbs) to avoid the use of force. Little of this thinking appears to have been 
incorporated in official responses to the emerging crisis. 
 
Convocation of the EC's Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991 came against the 
background of escalating conflict in Croatia and a clear European decision, debated in August 
and September, not to intervene militarily. The fighting in Croatia was not seen by Western 
policymakers as threatening their national security interests. In the absence of any prospect of 
external military intervention, the Serbian and Yugoslav Army leaderships were free to pursue a 
strategy of seizing Serb-populated regions of Croatia. As Paul Shoup and I have pointed out, 
…at the outset the Serbian leadership used the EC efforts to mediate a settlement among the 
former Yugoslav republics to nullify more forceful diplomacy by the international community, 
and in the process encouraged the JNA and Serbian nationalists to pursue their policy of creating 
a Greater Serbia based on military conquest. But, when the EC took more forceful action, by 
imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia and calling on the UN Security Council to use its coercive 
powers to bring peace to the region, the Serbian effort was redirected toward greater cooperation 
with the international community. Yet, Western policymakers failed to respond to changes in the 
Serbian position as they developed, and the opportunities to exploit the nuances evident in Serb 
positions by early November 1991.  
Western pressure in the form of negative sanctions, including adoption by the Security Council 
of Resolution 713 (25 September 1991) imposing an arms embargo against all of (former) 
Yugoslavia, was insufficient to reverse Serbian military actions. Cooperation by the Serbs 
extended only as far as accepting a UN-sponsored cease-fire in November 1991 and 
establishment of UN-protected areas in those regions of Croatia seized by the Yugoslav army, 
thus "freezing" Serbian gains and ending Serbian interest in further negotiations. Other 
provisions of the UN-sponsored Vance plan for Croatia were ignored. Once Croatia achieved 
international recognition in January 1992, it also had no further interest in negotiations, as these 
might have compromised its now internationally-recognized claim to sovereignty over the 
protected areas.  
 
In Bosnia, too, international recognition of the state came in the absence of a negotiated 
agreement among the conflicting parties. As in Croatia, recognition offered the single most 
powerful positive inducement to cooperation, and granting it (denying it, with respect to the 
Bosnian Serbs) without first seeking to extract cooperation had the effect of ending any 
incentives for the parties to negotiate. The timing of recognition was a matter of intense 
diplomatic maneuvering by the United States and its European allies, the Bosnian government, 
and Serbia, as well as intense political maneuvering among the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and 
Serbs in the period between December 1991 and March 1992. However, much of this effort 
unfolded after the referendum of February 29, and the Bosnian government's declaration of 
independence on March 3. By the time the EC and the United States recognized Bosnia, on April 
6 and 7, respectively, ethnic cleansing and localized fighting was already underway.  
 
International recognition of Croatia in January and of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April came in the 
midst of unresolved conflicts over the status of these territories. Fighting over the fate of the UN-
protected areas of Croatia was delayed until August 1995. In the absence of either a 
constitutional agreement on status among the conflicting Bosnian parties (and their neighbors) or 
an international commitment to defend the newly-recognized government of Bosnia or, better 
yet, both, recognition contributed to a rapid escalation of the conflict. Eleventh-hour negotiations 
to achieve such an agreement conducted for the EC by Jose Cutiliero in February and March 
ended in failure; in part because the lack of US interest in, or support for, the process signaled to 
the Bosnian Muslim leadership that they had only to withhold their agreement in order to win 
eventual US support. In effect, the United States had provided the Muslim-dominated Bosnian 
government, wittingly or not, with a positive inducement to intransigence. However, it is by no 
means certain that these negotiations would have succeeded even if recognition had been linked 
to an agreement. The negotiations began after the Muslim political leadership in control of the 
government declared Bosnian independence; Serbian and Bosnian Serb preparations for war may 
already have gone too far to be reversed; and, countervailing military action by the United States 
or the European powers to avert Serbian (and Croatian) aggression against the newly-recognized 
state appeared already to have been ruled out. Successful negotiations, even if supported by 
delayed recognition, would almost certainly have had to have begun much earlier, before the 
onset of dissolution.  
 
The approach taken in these early Western peacemaking efforts was based on the fundamentally 
flawed principle that the existing internal borders of the constituent units of the Yugoslav 
federation should become internationally-recognized borders. This represented a mechanistic 
transfer of Cold War era concepts to new circumstances, rather than a nuanced response to the 
specific characteristics of the conflict. It ignored the lack of correspondence between borders and 
identities in much of the Yugoslav federation and the dynamic of political conflict that this 
produced. Even this flawed approach was not implemented consistently, however. The demand 
for recognition by the Kosovar Albanians, for example, who comprised 90 percent of the 
population of an autonomous province that had dual status as a constituent unit of the federation 
and an integral part of the Serbian republic and thus could arguably have received the same 
treatment as the republics, was rejected. As Shoup and I have argued, this initial effort at 
peacemaking might have succeeded had the European strategy been formulated differently; in 
essence, holding the nationalist ambitions of dominant nations in each Yugoslav republic for 
international recognition hostage to prior agreement on borders and internal political order, 
including the effective protection of minority rights. By doing so, the Europeans, with support 
from the United States, would have defined a peaceful path by which each of the Yugoslav 
nations might have pursued its nationalist goals, a path that not only would have required each to 
negotiate, but would have enabled them to do so, rather than resort to force. Nonetheless, for this 
strategy of peacemaking to succeed, the intervening powers would have had to have mounted an 
effective threat to use countervailing force against any party that violated the peace. Neither the 
Europeans nor the Americans were prepared to make such a threat in the early stages of the 
Yugoslav conflicts. Indeed, the military option was explicitly dismissed on both sides of the 
Atlantic. With respect to the United States, at least, this can be attributed to the perception on the 
part of senior policymakers that no strategic US national interests were at risk.  
 
Despite adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 757 (30 May 1992) imposing economic 
sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the takeover of Sarajevo airport by 
UN peacekeepers in June 1992, it remained clear that the Western powers were not ready to 
impose a settlement by force when fighting broke out in Bosnia. Indeed, the agreement opening 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian relief specifically disavowed any precedent 
with respect to settlement of the larger conflict. US policymakers did not perceive any vital 
national interests to be at stake in the fighting. As a result, the United States not only resisted the 
use of force, but remained at the margins of diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia for 
almost two years. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was 
established in August 1992 under the co-sponsorship of the United Nations and the European 
Community and co-chaired by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (acting in his capacity 
as special representative of the UN Secretary General) and former British Foreign Minister Lord 
David Owen (acting as representative of the EC). Vance and Owen attempted to address the 
competing interests and claims of the warring parties by adopting a strategy of extensive 
territorial devolution. But each of the parties sought to use the negotiations as means of pursuing 
their own goals, rather than to pursue a genuine solution. The absence of any capacity to compel 
the parties to compromise led negotiators to offer last-minute concessions to the Serbs in April 
1993 that moved the proposal toward a strategy of partition. However, not even a partition plan 
could work as long as parties on the ground remained wedded to force, and major outside powers 
remained uninterested in compelling them to agree. Despite reports at the time that the United 
States was ready to commit troops to enforcement of the plan, and that NATO had prepared 
plans for deployment, the United States and its allies could not agree on exactly how or under 
what conditions force might be used. The absence of any Western threat of force - either to 
implement an agreed settlement or to impose a solution in the absence of agreement - led one 
member of the Vance-Owen team to liken the negotiations to playing "baseball without a bat." 
These problems --the lack of engagement on the part of the United States, and a concomitant 
absence of a credible threat of force-- continued to plague later negotiators even as they moved 
toward an explicit plan for partition in 1993 and 1994. 
 
Paul Shoup and I have documented the process by which the United States finally became 
seriously engaged in a strategy of coercive diplomacy in Bosnia in late 1994, when policymakers 
finally came to perceive the fighting as threatening US national interests. From that point 
forward the United States became increasingly determined to bring the fighting to an end. The 
result was adoption by the United States of a strategy of coercive diplomacy, described below, 
and what might be described as a successful case of intervention. Thus, it seems clear that the 
degree to which policymakers perceived the conflict as threatening vital US national interests 
was the critical factor in explaining the extent of US engagement and "willingness" to intervene 
in the conflict. 
 
Humanitarian Relief and Peacekeeping 
 
Humanitarian intervention began in Croatia with the establishment in February 1992 of the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for those areas of Croatia from which Yugoslav 
(Serbian) forces were to withdraw under the Vance plan. The mandate of UNPROFOR in 
Croatia was gradually expanded both territorially and functionally. Similarly, the deployment of 
UN troops to Bosnia began with the June 1992 action to reopen Sarajevo airport for 
humanitarian supply efforts, and expanded both territorially and functionally over time.  
The deployment of a humanitarian relief mission to Bosnia in the midst of continuing fighting 
reflected both the understanding of Western policymakers that the conflict was not going to end 
quickly, and their reluctance to intervene in it militarily. However, the deployment of a 
humanitarian mission protected by UNPROFOR gradually took on the characteristics of a 
limited military intervention. In an effort to secure delivery of humanitarian relief to Bosnian 
civilians, the Western allies secured adoption of Security Council Resolution 757 (May 30, 
1992) under Chapter VII authority, imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia and calling for the 
opening of Sarajevo airport. This was followed on June 5 by an agreement negotiated locally 
between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, allowing UNPROFOR to take 
control of the airport, and a decision by the Security Council on June 8 to expand the 
UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia in order to allow it to implement that agreement. The agreement 
was not implemented, however, until after UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali issued a vague 
ultimatum to the Serbs, and after French President Mitterand made a dramatic trip to Sarajevo 
airport that challenged Serb willingness to use force to keep the airport closed. Neither the 
ultimatum nor the visit offered much of a threat to the Serbs. But the agreement did offer an 
important positive inducement to the Serbs: control of the airport by a neutral force 
(UNPROFOR) that would prevent it from falling into the hands of Bosnian government, or 
Muslim, forces. There is also some evidence to suggest that Milosevic pressured the Bosnian 
Serb leadership to accept the agreement in an effort to avert implementation of the sanctions 
called for in Resolution 757. Indeed, the compelling effect of sanctions on Serbian (Milosevic's) 
behavior would grow stronger over time. It would come to play an important, if not critical, role 
in the success of coercive diplomacy in 1995. 
 
Continued Bosnian Serb resistance to the delivery of humanitarian relief to Bosnian Muslim 
populations under siege resulted in further expansion of Western intervention through 
UNPROFOR. Acting under the coercive authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it had 
when it imposed sanctions in May, the Security Council adopted Resolution 770 (13 August 
1992) authorizing the use of "all measures necessary" to deliver humanitarian assistance, and in 
Resolution 776 (14 September 1992) once again expanded the UNPROFOR mandate and 
authorized an increase in its strength. These steps toward a widening intervention in the conflict 
were contradicted, however, by highly restrictive rules of engagement that reflected the original 
Chapter VI authorization of the UNPROFOR mission, which made it dependent on the 
cooperation of local forces. In April 1993 Security Council Resolution 819 (16 April 1993) 
established Srebrenica as a "safe area." Resolution 824 (7 May 1993) extended this status to five 
additional areas. In Resolution 836 (June 4, 1993) the Security Council again invoked Chapter 
VII authority to assign UNPROFOR the task of deterring attacks on the safe areas, and defending 
them in the event of attack. As events at Srebrenica in July 1995 would make painfully obvious, 
these deployments did little to protect threatened populations, but did expose UNPROFOR 
troops to heightened risks and thus inevitably drew them more directly into the military conflict. 
As the mandate of UNPROFOR expanded, the distinction between "humanitarian" and 
"peacekeeping" activities, and even military intervention, became blurred. As most of the 
UNPROFOR troops were drawn from European NATO-member states, the distinction between 
UN involvement and Western intervention also became blurred.  
 
Ultimately, escalating risks to UNPROFOR troops from NATO-member states on the ground in 
Bosnia created the impetus for direct US and NATO military intervention to end the fighting. 
The threat to NATO cohesion posed by the prospect that these troops might be overwhelmed in 
the absence of support from the United States, and the daunting military and political challenges 
of waiting to assist them until they were already under attack, created a compelling US national 
interest in bringing the fighting in Bosnia to a rapid conclusion. While policymakers' initial 
assessments that no strategic national interest was at stake limited initial engagement in the 
conflict, that engagement tended over time to expand incrementally in response to events on the 
ground and, in part, media coverage that created pressure on policymakers to "do something" in 
response to egregious developments. The gradual expansion of resources committed to the 
conflict, in turn, created a real national interest in ending it where none had existed before. Thus, 
the decision to intervene directly in the conflict with military force in support of a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy reflected a change in national decisionmakers' calculations of the interests 
put at risk by the conflict. 
Deterrence 
Over the course of the war, the United States participated in five attempts to use the threat of 
force to persuade or compel the Bosnian Serbs either to cease or to refrain from certain actions. 
Although these were limited in scope and intent, together they had the effect of expanding the 
Western commitment of material and other resources to the conflict. First, in response to the 
Serb "strangulation" of Sarajevo in the summer of 1993 that resulted from increased shelling of 
the city and ground action that suggested an imminent frontal assault on the city, NATO issued a 
vague threat of future action against those who attacked UN forces or obstructed humanitarian 
aid. Despite signs of differences among the allies, the Bosnian Serbs ended their immediate 
threat to the city. Second, in February 1994, the United States and its NATO allies responded to 
a shelling of the Markala marketplace in Sarajevo attributed to the Bosnian Serbs by issuing an 
ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from around the city. A threat of NATO 
air attack led the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw, and to the establishment of a heavy weapons 
exclusion zone around Sarajevo.  
 
The US and NATO threat to use force in connection with the 1993 crisis over the "strangulation" 
of Sarajevo, and in response to the Markala marketplace massacre in February 1994 can be 
considered successful, but limited acts of intervention that displayed some of the characteristics 
of coercive diplomacy identified by Alexander George. In each case, a threat of air attack was 
employed to compel the Bosnian Serbs to pull back from Sarajevo and reduce, at least 
temporarily, their attacks on the city. Issuance of an ultimatum was accompanied by crisis 
negotiations. But, in each case, special circumstances secured Serb compliance. Shoup and I 
have pointed out that Bosnian Serb agreement was secured in no small part by the fact that in 
1993 the Serbs were not required to withdraw so far as to prevent them from renewing artillery 
fire on the city; were able to secure UN occupation of strategic territory, thereby denying it to the 
Muslims; and appeared to have pushed resolution of the conflict in the direction of a UN-
patrolled partition based on the status quo. Similarly, in 1994 negotiators agreed to prevent the 
Muslims (Bosnian government) from gaining control over territory relinquished by the Serbs by 
deploying Russian peacekeepers to the territory. In each case the demand advanced by the 
NATO allies was one to which the Serbs could agree. The agreements served Serb interests by 
keeping alive negotiations for a comprehensive cease-fire that would freeze existing Serb 
territorial gains. Thus, the Serbs did comply; at least in the short-run.  
 
That neither of these episodes led to concessions that advanced the conflict toward resolution 
may be attributed to the fact that in both instances negotiations with the Serbs were not carried 
out by the coercing party (NATO and the United States), but by a third party--the UN 
commander--not under the control of, and with quite different interests from, those of the 
coercing party. The goals to which coercion was applied were in each case limited in scope. The 
threat of force used to secure the pullback of the Serbs from around Sarajevo was not 
accompanied in either 1993 or 1994 by more comprehensive efforts--at least, not on the part of 
the principal coercer, the United States--to settle the larger conflict. Nonetheless, the 1994 action 
did result in a cease-fire and a significant easing of the conflict. The use of force in these cases 
can be attributed to a desire on the part of Western policymakers to contain the conflict, and to 
respond to media pressure to "do something," rather than a commitment on their part to end it. 
There is no evidence that policymakers had changed their view that the conflict did not threaten 
strategic interests and therefore did not warrant a significant commitment of national resources to 
its resolution. 
 
In some respects, however, these attempts to use force made matters in Bosnia worse. The 
apparent increase in US and NATO involvement and the threat of force against the Serbs 
contributed in each case to a hardening of Bosnian Muslim positions in the negotiations over a 
political settlement taking place in Geneva under the auspices of the International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). This contradictory outcome suggests one of the difficulties of 
intervening against only one party to a conflict involving multiple actors. Because the interests of 
the Bosnian actors were most often in opposition, threats or coercion applied against one in order 
to encourage that party to negotiate or comply would make one or more of the others less willing 
to negotiate or comply. The fact that the threat of force was not actually carried out in connection 
with either the "strangulation" crisis or the Markala marketplace massacre, and that the Serbs 
were able both to keep their immediate concessions modest and to reverse them later, weakened 
the credibility of subsequent US and NATO threats in the eyes of both the Serbs and the 
Muslims. In effect, both these "successful" cases of limited intervention actually "upped the 
ante" for the later, more comprehensive intervention intended to bring the conflict to an end. 
 
The third use of force for deterrence, in April 1994, consisted of three limited air attacks--
derisively characterized in the Western media as "pinpricks"--were carried out against Serb 
forces threatening to overrun the Muslim-held enclave of Gorazde, in eastern Bosnia. The air 
attacks were followed by another NATO ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw, and at least some 
consideration of the use of more extensive force against them. But any effort to use further force 
was blocked by Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the United Nations Secretary General, 
who exercised "dual key" control over the use of force by the West, which was operating in 
Bosnia under a United Nations mandate. This unwieldy command structure reflected the concern 
among contributing states that UNPROFOR troops (the majority of which came from NATO-
member states) should not be put at risk by the use of air power. It was this concern that had led 
the Europeans to reject an earlier US proposal to "lift and strike"; i.e., to lift the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian government and use air power against the Serbs. An exclusion zone was 
established around Gorazde in 1994, but the confrontation was allowed to wind down without a 
definitive conclusion. However, events in Gorazde alerted Western policymakers to another 
possible constraint on the use of air power in Bosnia: In response to the airstrikes, the Serbs had 
taken some 200 UN and civilian personnel hostage. Concern for their fate may have contributed 
to the reluctance of Akashi to authorize further use of force in Gorazde. This standoff over the 
use of air power between the UN and troop-contributing countries on the one hand and the 
United States on the other continued until 1995, when the credibility of UN operations was 
finally expended, their collapse appeared imminent, and the United States had committed itself 
to deploying troops to secure the safe withdrawal of allied and other UNPROFOR forces. Only 
then was the United States able to secure the support of its allies for a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. Thus, divisions between the United States and its allies over the proper course of 
action in Bosnia may have represented as important an impediment to decisive intervention 
before 1995 as the risks of intervention itself. 
 
The fourth example of deterrence through use of force, in November 1994, consisted of NATO 
air attacks against a Serb airbase and three Serb SAM missile sites in the Bihac area in response 
to Serb attacks that threatened to overrun the Muslim-held enclave in Western Bosnia. The 
events in Bihac seemed to raise the stakes of the Bosnian conflict for the US and European 
policymakers. UNPROFOR forces were caught in the fighting and suffered several casualties. 
The involvement of Serb ground and air forces operating from the Serb-held territories of Croatia 
just across the nearby border threatened to escalate the fighting and draw the Croatian regular 
army into the battle, with the potential to re-ignite fighting in Croatia. After the Serbs had 
launched a missile attack using converted SAM missiles and air strikes from their airbase in 
Croatia, NATO planes struck that airbase and then, two days later, three Serb SAM sites in the 
Bihac area. Once again, the Serbs seized UN personnel as hostages to deter further NATO 
attacks. NATO leaders convened to consider both proposals to demilitarize and secure the Bihac 
safe area, and proposals to carry out wide-ranging air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. They 
could not agree on a course of action. At the same time, however, the Serbs began allowing UN 
aid convoys into the pocket, and Bosnian Muslim troops began slipping out of the pocket, 
thereby lessening tensions. Thus, while the allies remained deeply divided over further action, 
this crisis, too, ended inconclusively with little net change in the status quo.  
 
The fifth and final attempt to use force consisted of the use of airpower against Bosnian Serb in 
May 1995. An escalation of fighting on the ground and increased Serb shelling of Sarajevo had 
raised serious doubts among UN officials about continuation of the UNPROFOR deployment, 
and led to both threats of withdrawal and demands for the use of airpower against the Serbs from 
the US and European states. The UNPROFOR commander warned both the Muslims and the 
Serbs to halt the use of heavy weapons, and issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw from 
the exclusion zone around Sarajevo. When they failed to comply, NATO carried out air strikes 
against Serb ammunition bunkers in Pale, east of Sarajevo. These attacks failed to compel the 
Serbs. Rather, they produced what Alexander George might characterize as an escalatory 
response. The Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla, then seized UN personnel as hostages, using them as 
human shields against further attack -- a response that should have been anticipated by NATO 
policymakers on the basis of earlier Bosnian Serb reactions to the use of airpower against them at 
Bihac and Gorazde. The Serb reaction not only compelled NATO to cease its use of force, but 
also forced UNPROFOR to renounce the future use of force by reaffirming its adherence to strict 
peacekeeping principles as a condition for release of the UN hostages. Thus, while the earlier 
instances of the use of force did have at least a short-term deterrent effect on the Serbs, the May 
1995 events had no such effect. On the contrary, they had the effect of deterring UNPROFOR 
from further use of force, and thereby contributed to both the collapse of the UN mission in 
Bosnia and the emergence of a comprehensive, US-led strategy of coercive diplomacy. 
 
None of these episodes of more direct, military-political intervention in reaction to specific local 
developments in Bosnia was undertaken on the basis of a clear plan or even concept for ending 
the larger conflict in which they were embedded. The May air strikes were openly criticized in 
the West for the lack of preparation behind them. One unnamed US official suggested that the 
May events amounted to little more than "drop a few bombs and see what happens." More 
comprehensive strategies of intervention, such as the US proposal to lift the arms embargo and 
use air strikes to protect the Bosnian Muslims while they armed and prepared themselves for war 
against the Serbs ("lift and strike"), were considered at various times during 1993 and 1994 but 
rejected, either by European actors concerned they might subject their troops in UNPROFOR to 
increased risk, or by US policymakers concerned that direct intervention represented a "slippery 
slope" of involvement in a potential quagmire. In August 1992, then-Deputy Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger had publicly drawn direct parallels between intervention in Bosnia and 
earlier US involvements in Lebanon and Vietnam. In August 1993, an unnamed "top 
policymaker" in the Clinton administration told Washington reporter Elizabeth Drew that "this 
thing is a no-winner; it's going to be a quagmire." In the cases of Sarajevo and Gorazde, more 
expansive or decisive action was precluded by UN resistance to widening the conflict or, 
especially, putting UN personnel at even greater risk. In the case of Bihac, it was precluded by 
continuing differences between the United States and at least some of its NATO allies arising out 
of their differing commitments and attendant risks. However, the threat to alliance cohesion 
evident in these differences, and particularly the conclusion drawn by some in the media that 
these events suggested that NATO lacked resolve, led to reconsideration of Bosnia policy by 
senior US officials and, therefore, the NATO allies. Repeated use of force for deterrence 
underscored the cumulative impact of limited engagement on the perception of national interests. 
It was the perception that strategic interests, both US and common US/European, had been put at 
risk that led to adoption of a strategy of coercive diplomacy in 1995.  
Coercive Diplomacy 
The above examples reinforce the view that limited interventions motivated by humanitarian 
concerns or policymakers' perceived need to "do something" in the face of mounting public 
and/or media pressure, rather than by clearly-defined national interests, result in poorly 
conceived and inadequately implemented actions. The uses of force in Gorazde and Bihac 
represented responses to what were perceived as Serb attempts to alter the military balance 
decisively in their favor. But the threat and use of force in Gorazde and Bihac were of only 
limited military value, and were not accompanied by a serious effort to extract any larger 
political concessions from the Serbs. Their net effect, if any, appears to have been to deepen 
divisions within NATO over the use of force, and erode the effectiveness of any future threat to 
do so. Paradoxically, however, the prospect of irreparable damage to the internal cohesion and 
external credibility of the NATO alliance created a powerful US national interest in bringing the 
war to an end on terms more favorable to the Muslims and Croats with whom NATO had been 
cooperating. 
The divisions within the alliance that followed the limited use of force against the Serbs at Bihac 
in November 1994 led United States policymakers to adopt a more comprehensive approach to 
ending the conflict in Bosnia, and to begin to intervene more directly in the conflict to implement 
that approach. US policymakers concluded that the use of force alone was futile, that the Serbs 
had to be given incentives to accept a settlement, and that if force were to be used it had to be 
used to support a political settlement. US diplomats entered into direct negotiations with both 
Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, and prepared to back up their negotiating positions with a more 
credible threat of force. The establishment of a credible threat required intensive diplomatic 
efforts with NATO allies and Russia, primarily in the context of the Contact Group, so as to 
establish a set of shared perceptions, commitments, and goals. It also required the continuation of 
efforts to shift the military balance on the ground in Bosnia against the Serbs. In order to exercise 
control over negotiations with the target(s) of coercion, the United States had to shift 
negotiations over a political settlement away from the ICFY and to the Contact Group, and to 
alter the very nature of those negotiations. Rather than ICFY-mediated exchanges among the 
warring parties in search of a mutually acceptable solution, the Contact Group powers now 
negotiated among themselves in search of a solution they all could accept and then impose on the 
warring parties. The United States can thus be said to have laid the basis for a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy in Bosnia in late 1994. But it was not until July 1995 that policymakers 
appear self-consciously to have committed themselves to such a strategy. Direct, decisive US 
intervention in the conflict can thus be dated either to late 1994 or mid-1995. 
 
The decision by US policymakers to intervene more directly in Bosnia was driven for the most 
part by concern that US troops would be drawn into a potentially costly operation to evacuate 
United Nations forces, including those of the NATO allies. UNPROFOR had become the target 
of increasing attacks in the wake of events at Bihac. According to Richard Holbrooke, following 
the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 and the realization that the UN operation was 
heading for failure, "the President saw the degree to which involvement was now inevitable, and 
how much better it would be to have involvement built on success rather than failure." The resort 
to coercive diplomacy in 1995 was thus driven by a clear sense of national interest in avoiding a 
potential military catastrophe that might threaten the survival of the NATO alliance. But 
policymakers in the Clinton administration, including the President, also turned to coercive 
diplomacy out of a narrower sense of political self-interest; an interest in resolving the Bosnian 
issue in time to prevent the presumed Republican candidate for president from using it against 
the administration in the 1996 election. A journalistic account of the policy debates within the 
administration in June and July makes clear the intensity with which policymakers felt these 
concerns.  
 
Unlike the earlier uses of force for deterrence in Bosnia, outlined above, the US intervention that 
unfolded in late 1994 and 1995 was directed toward a specific, comprehensive goal: achieving an 
agreement that would put an end to the fighting. This was a goal shared by the United States and 
its allies, who also were concerned about the consequences of a collapse of the UN mission for 
their troops on the ground. This convergence of allied goals around a clear shared interest in 
avoiding catastrophe made the management of alliance politics over Bosnia more tractable in the 
period July-October 1995 than it had been at any point in the three previous years.  
 
The success of coercive diplomacy in Bosnia in 1995 was built on changes in the military 
situation on the ground in the direction of a stalemate or standoff between the parties. In the 
literature on conflict resolution, the emergence of such a stalemate is seen as "ripening" and is 
characterized as "hurting" when each party is assumed to be neither willing or capable of 
enduring it, nor able to overcome it. In Bosnia, however, Shoup and I have demonstrated that, 
contrary to the spontaneous process posited in the literature, the "ripening" process in Bosnia 
was manufactured or engineered by the coercing power. US support for the development of the 
regular Croatian army and its war fighting capacity began more than a year earlier, before 
coercive diplomacy was adopted as a strategy. Moreover, the stalemate in Bosnia was clearly not 
"hurting;" it was a stalemate enforced by the United States, which was determined not to allow 
the strategic balance between Croatia and Serbia essential to regional stability to be tipped in 
favor of Croatia. It should be noted that a major role in establishing the conditions for this 
stalemate was played by the tragedies in Srebrenica and Zepa, which involved genocidal killing 
of Muslims by Serbs, but which were greeted by some US officials as events that eliminated 
heretofore thorny map problems.  
 
The success of coercive diplomacy in Bosnia also involved a change in the US political position. 
Alexander George suggests that for a strategy of coercive diplomacy to succeed, the demands 
imposed on the object of coercion must in the end be ones that can be accepted. In the case of 
Bosnia, this required the United States to alter its demands from those based on one-sided 
support for the Bosnian Muslims (and Bosnian Croats, to the extent that these two parties could 
be kept in agreement), to those based on recognition of the need to address the real and often 
conflicting interests of all sides, including the outside actors, Serbia (Milosevic) and Croatia 
(Tudjman). A December 1994 NATO declaration calling for "equitable and balanced 
arrangements," signaled the onset of this transformation. It was completed by the de facto 
recognition of "Republika Srpska" and partition of Bosnia incorporated in a September 1 
agreement negotiated by Holbrooke with Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, which provided the 
general framework for the later Dayton settlement.  
 
The key to securing Milosevic's cooperation from this point on, including his dramatic role at 
Dayton, appears to have been the combination of a credible threat that the Bosnian Serbs would 
be defeated on the battlefield, thereby tipping the larger balance of power in the region against 
Serbia; and the positive inducements of recognition for the Bosnian Serb republic and a promise 
to lift sanctions against Serbia (formally, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or FRY). The 
threat was made credible by the successes of the Croatian army and by the application of limited 
but significant US and NATO air power. As noted earlier, Milosevic's interest in lifting sanctions 
had been clear since 1993. He had been pursuing that interest in intensive negotiations in May 
and June 1995 with the US diplomat then responsible for Bosnia, Robert Frasure. Milosevic's 
cooperation at Dayton appears to have been secured in an apparent deal with Holbrooke in 
exchange for sanctions-lifting. 
The final factor in the successful application of coercive diplomacy to ending the war in Bosnia, 
of course, was the use of airpower. These words are often followed by the phrase "against the 
Serbs." But air power was used not only to pressure the Serbs into specific action on the ground--
primarily a withdrawal from around Sarajevo--but also to pressure the Muslims into accepting 
the emerging partition of Bosnia; and it was the end of bombing that opened the door to a cease-
fire agreement and negotiations, not its onset. The agreement on "basic constitutional principles" 
for Bosnia, signed by the foreign ministers of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia on September 8 in 
Geneva, was reached while the bombing was still in progress. But the bombing did not, in fact, 
"bring the Serbs to the negotiating table." Milosevic was already moving in early August toward 
establishing control over the Bosnian Serbs so as to bring them to the negotiating table, and had 
completed his moves before the bombing began. It appears that it was the Bosnian Muslims who 
were brought to the negotiating table by the bombing or, more accurately, by the threat that it 
would be ended if they did not agree to the US settlement. The initial decision to "suspend" the 
bombing on September 14 came in exchange for Bosnian Serb agreement to withdraw their 
heavy weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and end the siege of that city.  
 
At the same time, the United States did not allow the combined Croatian-Muslim offensive in 
western Bosnia that followed the ouster of the Krajina Sebs to inflict too great a defeat on the 
Bosnian Serbs. To have done so might have drawn Serbia into the conflict directly and 
threatened the strategic balance in the region. The bombing in Bosnia constituted the "exemplary 
use of quite limited force to persuade the opponent to back down" consistent with Alexander 
George's model of coercive diplomacy. George defines "exemplary" as "the use of just enough 
force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one's interests and to establish 
the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary." A military analyst points 
out that the total effort "equated to just about a busy day's sorties count for coalition air forces 
during the Gulf War" and characterizes it as "a strategically limited, tactically intense, high-
technology, coalition air campaign, conducted under tight restraints of time and permissible 
collateral damage… aimed at coercing political and military compliance from a regional 
opponent who had no airpower." The United States and its NATO allies were careful not to use 
so much force as to lead either side to believe that all was won or lost, thereby creating real 
incentives to accept the US settlement. 
 
To a certain extent, the "balancing act" carried out by US diplomats--led by Richard Holbrooke--
in their relations with the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, during the bombing was necessitated by 
the pressures exerted by the British, French, and Russians. The British and French refused to 
"wage war on behalf of the Muslim-led government," while the Russians continued to oppose the 
bombing. However, "balancing" reflected to a far greater extent the difficulties of applying the 
techniques of coercive diplomacy to the behaviors of multiple parties with conflicting interests. 
This is a far more difficult task than attempting to affect the behavior of a single opponent. By 
facilitating the emergence of a Croatian ground army and using air power against the Bosnian 
Serb army, the United States encouraged the political and territorial ambitions of the Croats and 
the Muslims. The United States, therefore, did not prevent the Bosnian Serbs from using artillery 
withdrawn from Sarajevo, and Serbian air power, to stop the Croatian and Muslim advance in 
western Bosnia. Whereas Holbrooke had blamed the Serbs for the difficulties of negotiations in 
August and September, for example, by October he was blaming the Muslims for blocking the 
conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. The cooperation of Milosevic was the direct result of the 
coercive diplomacy ---the combination of threats, inducements, and actual use of force-- 
exercised by the United States. On October 4, Holbrooke cautioned Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic that he was "playing craps with the destiny of his country" by refusing to agree to a 
cease-fire, and warned him that "If you want to let the fighting go on, that is your right, but do 
not expect the United States to be your air force." Despite this threat, the Bosnian Muslims 
refused to agree to a cease-fire until they had extracted a commitment from the United States to 
provide them with military assistance. The United States was therefore compelled to supply both 
positive and negative incentives to cooperation to all the parties directly involved in the Bosnian 
conflict (the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats; and both Tudjman and Milosevic) in order to 
ensure success. Thus, even the most successful case of direct intervention in the Bosnian conflict 
suggests caution: The difficulties of balancing relations among allies --coalition management-- 
magnifies the already difficult task of balancing actions directed against each of the warring 
parties in a multi-sided internal conflict. 
Military Occupation and State-Building 
The military-political intervention characterized above as "coercive diplomacy" ended the 
fighting in Bosnia, but did not end the conflict among the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs. In 
an attempt to do so, the United States also engaged in a direct political intervention; imposing its 
own solution at Dayton, enforcing it through the deployment of NATO and other forces to 
Bosnia, and establishing a de facto international protectorate over the country. These actions 
have redirected the conflict to more, but not entirely, peaceful means. But they have been 
insufficient to resolve the fundamental conflict in any meaningful time frame. The Dayton 
arrangements have left power divided among the three major ethnic groups and between the 
central state and its constituent entities (the Federation and the Serb Republic) and lower units 
(cantons and local governments). Even after more than six years, there are no authoritative 
institutions capable of formulating and implementing policies for the whole state. As a result, the 
local representative of international authority in Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative, 
has had to intervene repeatedly to impose policy decisions where local actors proved unable or 
unwilling to do so on their own. Paradoxically, to the extent that international institutions 
continue to perform such a role, Bosnian institutions will remain internally divided and 
incapable. Yet, there is no clear exit option for international forces in Bosnia that does not 
increase the risk of renewed violent conflict among the three Bosnian ethnic communities to 
unacceptably high levels. Intervention in Bosnia has thus taken on the characteristics of an open-
ended commitment to administer the territory. 
Conclusion: Assessing the Bosnian Interventions 
Intervention in Bosnia began relatively early in the conflict, but was limited in scope and 
objective. It represented the continuation of Western efforts to contain the destabilizing 
consequences of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, rather than an effort to facilitate 
meaningful settlement of the issues driving the conflict to violence. Such an effort appeared to be 
closed off by the commitment of the West to existing borders, and therefore recognition of the 
former republics of the Yugoslav federation as states, prior to negotiation among the conflicting 
parties of an agreement on either new borders or a new political order within the existing 
borders. The Bosnian case offers a clear example of how even a limited commitment to 
containment and humanitarian relief may lead, incrementally, to a major commitment to direct 
intervention. Each commitment of diplomatic energy ("prestige") and military and material 
resources to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and successive attempts at deterrence, created the basis 
for arguments for further expansion of Western commitments until the level of prestige and 
resources committed to the conflict created a compelling national interest in securing a favorable 
outcome. The interests that in the end compelled armed intervention as part of the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy were not, therefore, the product of the conflict itself; at no point did Western 
policymakers appear to view the conflict in Bosnia itself as threatening to national interests.  
 
This view of the conflict was at the time and remains today highly controversial. Some in the 
United States argued then, and continue to argue today that the Serbs were committing genocide 
against the Muslims and that the United States was not only obligated to intervene, but had a 
(moral) interest in doing so. The debate over the place of moral values in the definition of 
American national interest remained unresolved, however. The threats to national interests that in 
the end motivated US intervention in the Bosnian conflict derived from the consequences of the 
conflict for NATO cohesion and the potential consequences of the conflict for electoral politics 
in the United States, not the nature of the war itself. In short, limited intervention itself created 
the impetus for further intervention by raising the political cost of inaction. 
 
The coordinated military-political intervention, or strategy of coercive diplomacy carried out in 
1995 can be considered successful because it achieved the primary goals of Western 
policymakers: it put an end to the fighting, averted a catastrophic withdrawal of allied forces 
under fire, and it established a Bosnian state within existing borders. It also put a halt, however 
belatedly, to the genocidal killing in Bosnia and stemmed the flow of refugees to the West. But 
intervention did not settle the conflict; it transformed the struggle among Bosnian Muslims, 
Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs from a military to a political conflict. The Dayton agreement 
left power divided among the three groups, and between the central state and its constituent 
entities (the Bosnian Federation and the Serb Republic), as well as the lower-level cantons and 
local governments. The difficulties of establishing central Bosnian government authority over the 
entire country, achieving inter-ethnic reconciliation, re-settling refugees in the towns and villages 
from which they had fled or been "cleansed," and reviving the economy during the more than 
five years of effective international occupation, all reflect the continuation of inter-group conflict 
in Bosnia. Although there are some limited signs of hope in the emergence of a multi-ethnic 
political party that is gaining some power and authority in the country, the international 
community, through the Office of the High Representative, continues to play a critical role in 
resolving political deadlocks, imposing public policies on the Bosnian state, and negating 
political processes that produce unsatisfactory outcomes. This leaves it unclear whether the 
Bosnian state could survive in the absence of an international civil, police, and military presence. 
Thus, the post-conflict tasks of occupation and state-building have turned into an open-ended 
commitment for the West. At best, it amounts to an effort to "buy time" for the establishment of 
a stable state within existing borders, the only basis for "exit" of international forces and the 
conclusion of the Bosnian intervention. 
 
